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Some Humane Features of
Pentateuchal Law
La ciencia de las leyes es como fuente de justicia,
e aprovechase de ella el mundo mas que de otro ciencia. (The science of law is, as it were, the fountain
of justice, and the world derives more benefit from
it than from any other science).-Alfonso the Wise,
Las Sieta Partidas, Pt. II, Lib. xxi, Ley 8.

It has been said that the development of Hebrew law
was not in advance of the race amongst which it existed
and that "that race was not advanced in culture beyond
many which have been long since forgotten", but was "comparatively low in the scale of civilization". However this
may be (and probably none has been as frank as the
Hebrew in admitting national short-comings), it is conceived that Israel's contribution to modern civilization in
the fields of literature, practical wisdom and ethics is priceless. True, she never attained the commercial success of
the Phoenicians, the engineering skill of the Romans, or
the architectural ability of the Greeks, and in these particulars may be conceded to have been "comparatively low
in the scale of civilization", but it is believed that she ex-

celled all her contemporaries in the humane spirit of her
jurisprudence; and when we realize that the old common
law of the Anglo-American system never contained any
principles prohibiting cruelty to animals, we may be permitted to dissent from the conclusions of those writers on
comparative jurisprudence who have allowed themselves to
write disparagingly of the law of the Hebrews. At the
same time it must be admitted that to the man in the
street and even to Macauley's erudite schoolboy, the title
of this paper may sound ironical, for it is not uncommon
to find critics who designate Jewish law as a harsh and
cruel system. So prevalent is this conventional impression
that the writer once heard an eminent divine concede the
cruelty of Israelitish law and defend the system on the
ground that it was the most humane system of its day.
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If these far-spread beliefs are correct, and, as previously noted, they are reflected, even in the pages of some
writers on comparative jurisprudence, the tiny nation in
southern Syria, (midway between Connecticut and New
Jersey in size), birth-place of two religions and perennial
source of literary inspiration for nearly two thousand years,
has failed lamentably in the most extensively published
system of law known to mankind. Why this almost ineradicable feeling of prejudice? When pressed for an explanation, the conventional answer is a quotation of the
familiar "eye for an eye" etc., early expressions of lex
talionis, an ancient Semitic principle laid down in almost
startlingly Pentateuchal terms in the Code of Hammurabi,
contemporary of Abraham, and, so far as can be ascertained, just as prevalent at one time among Aryan peoples
as it was with the Semitic and non-Semitic peoples from
whose traditional usages the Code of Hammurabi drew
the bulk of its material. Looking at the matter dispassionately from the standard of abstract justice and fairplay, there is nothing excessive or disproportionate in deciding that with what measure a wrong-doer shall mete
shall it be meted unto him. Apart from this, we must not
overlook that at a very early era abuse of right was scrupulously guarded against by prohibition of vengeance (Ex.
4, 5). Furthermore there are unmistakable traces of weregeld, so firmly established that it was found necessary to
regulate it and restrict its application to cases which did
not amount to capital offences. Thus we find it ordained
that "ye shall take no satisfaction (ransom) for the life of
a murderer". (Num. 35, 31). It is submitted that in many
particulars the ancient law of the Hebrews would not be
considered savage at the present day. On the contrary,
some of its provisions raise a standard of legal duty whose
humanity is far in advance of our time. Unhappily the
left wing of the Puritan revolutionists, in their mechanical
and undiscriminating adoption of Biblical texts as the law
in Massachusetts and Connecticut, overlooked many fundamental principles such as the privilege against self-crimination, and failed to observe such post-Pentateuchal texts as
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Proverbs 3, 3, Zechariah 7, 9, and others extolling the
quality of mercy. This historic experiment in the colonies
of Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, New Haven and Connecticut, had such unfortunate consequences that a deeplyrooted prejudice has spread among many people against
Hebrew law. It is hardly necessary to remark that after
the amalgamation of New Haven with Connecticut, and of
Plymouth with Massachusetts Bay, the old experiment was
permanently abandoned.'
An outstanding feature of the law of Israel was its
careful eradication of all temptation to resort to the "third
degree" and other form of torture to extract confession
of crime. "No man can make himself out wicked", is a
maxim repeatedly cited in the Talmud-an admirable shorthand statement of the ancient Jewish law against selfcrimination; which was that at the mouth of two or more
witnesses, (not of one only), could an accused be convicted
of crime whether capital or of less degree. (Deut. 17, 6;
Num. 35, 30; Deut. 19, 15). Contrast this state of affairs
with the savage cruelty inflicted by police officials in our
National capital, as set forth in terms of studied moderation by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the case of Ziang Sung Wan
v. United States.2 Apart from the inhumanity and unconstitutionality of such outrages, the practices of "all-night
grillings" and other inquisitional practices too often reported as taking place without any disclaimer from government authority, are opposed to the teachings of experience, as shown by Judge Cooley in his masterly work
on Constitutional Limitations in which he says,
"Under the excitement of a charge of crime, coolness and self-possession are to be looked for in very
few persons; and however strongly we may reason
with ourselves that no one will confess a heinous
offense of which he is not guilty, the records of
criminal courts bear abundant testimony to the contrary. If confessions could prove a crime beyond
'Thorpe, Constitutions and Charters (1909) 529, 533; 3 Ibid.
1870, 1882.

2266 U. S. 1 (1924).
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doubt, no act which was ever punished criminally
would be better established than witchcraft; and the
judicial executions which have been justified by such
confessions ought to constitute a solemn warning
against the too ready reliance upon confessions as
proof of guilt in any case."

Fanatical self-inflicted torture-a practice still extant
in some parts of Asia and America-was flatly forbidden.
(Deut. 14. 1, 2; Lev. 19. 28; Lev. 21. 5.). Man-stealingregarded by Christopher Columbus and many other famous
people as a mere peccadillo-was punishable with death

(Ex. 21. 16; Deut. 24. 7). Manumission of bond-servants
was compulsory after six years service (Deut. 15. 12; Ex.
21. 2), except where the servant refused his freedom (Ex.
21. 6); and upon emancipation the servant was entitled to
be furnished liberally (Deut. 15. 13, 14). Another safeguard was the rule that harsh treatment by a master
amounting to maiming was ground for freedom (Ex. 21.
26, 27). It has been asserted that the slave code of Abyssinia was copied from the ancient Jewish law, but the
present writer has had no convenient opportunity of verifying this interesting suggestion. Hired servants, whether
native or foreign, were likewise under the protection of
the law.
Thou shalt not oppress a hired servant that is poor
and needy, whether he be of thy brethren, or of thy
strangers that are in thy lands within thy gates;
At his day thou shalt give him his hire, neither shall
the sun go down upon it, for he is poor, and setteth
his heart upon it; lest he cry against thee unto the

Lord, and it be sin unto thee.-(Deut. 24: 14, 15).
It is submitted that the foregoing is an admirably succinct
statement of a rule of law, clarified by soecific illustration
accompanied by an illuminating exposition of its basic
policy. Not only were slaves and hired servants placed
under the protection of the law, but in addition, poor and
needy freemen were objects of special solicitude, anything
savoring of extortion being proscribed, whether under the
guise of interest (Ex, 22. 26; Lev. 25. 36, 37; Deut. 23. 19)
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or of collateral security for loans (Ex. 22. 26; Deut. 24. 6, 10,
13, 17). Further protection was afforded by what appears
to have been a moratorium for poor debtors at the end of
six years (Deut. 15. 1-7). Repeated references to the
"stranger" exhibit care that, in general, aliens should receive equal treatment with native sons; with the exception
that interest could be charged against foreigners (Deut.
23, 20), foreign-born slaves wvere not entitled to emancipation (Lev. 25. 44-46; Deut. 15. 12), and the moratorium
previously referred to did not apply to aliens (Deut. 15. 3).
Active charity was incumbent upon land-holders who
were commanded to refrain from wholly reaping the corners of the field, and forbidden to gather the gleaning, the
overlooked sheaf and fallen fruit, all of which were allotted
to the poor and the stranger (Lev. 19. 9, 10, 23, 22; Deut.
24. 19). Nor was this all, for the tithes of every third
year belonged to the Levite, the fatherless, the widow and
the stranger (Deut. 26. 12), and in the fallow year, the
poor were to have what they required of the produce, after
which the animals were to have the remainder. It is difficult to see anything "backward" or "comparatively low in
the scale of civilization", in such thoughtful and considerate
provisions for the relief of the needy. What may be termed
mental cruelty was made an offence against the law of
Israel. Accordingly the passage "thou shalt not go about
as a tale-bearer among thy people" (Lev. 19. 16) was construed not only to cover slander but in addition the evilspeaking discountenanced in the Book of Common Prayer
of the Episcopal church.' Perhaps the noblest of all the
provisions in regard to the treatment one should accord his
fellow man, are those foreshadowing the "good turn" of
the Boy Scouts, by enacting that a man should take care
of the lost property of another, even though the latter hate
him (Ex. 23. 4; Deut. 22. 1-3).
3The

basic principle of this last cited law of the Hebrews was

applied in the Canadian case of Zielitzki v. Obadisk, (1921) 3 West.
Wkly. 229, which laid down the rule that negligent dissemination of

falsehood resulting in private injury is actionable.
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Humanitarians scanning the pages of the Pentateuch
would find little material for adverse comment in the Hebrew law dealing with the treatment of animals-sentient
beings with no legal rights as they have been termed by a
modern jurist. No less than three times it is commanded
that beasts of burden and all domestic animals be given
rest on the Sabbath day (Ex. 20. 10, and 23. 12; Deut. 5. 14).
Twice it is ordained that help be given to raise a fallen
beast of burden. As previously mentioned the fallow land
produce was partly dedicated to the feeding of domestic
animals (Ex. 23. 11), and finally thoughtless and unnecessary cruelty was unequivocably forbidden such as
muzzling the ox at work on the threshing-floor (Deut. 25.
4); working together animals of different species (Deut.
22. 10); and untimely separation of mother and young (Ex.
22. 30; Lev. 22. 27).
"When one is immersed in his own law, in his own
country, unable to see things from without, he has a psychologically unavoidable tendency to consider as natural, as
necessary, as given by God, things which are simply due to
historical accident or temporary social situation . . To see
things in their true light, we must see them from a certain
distance as strangers, which is impossible when we study
any phenomena of our own country. That is why comparative law should be one of the necessary elements in the
training of all those who are to shape the law for societies
in which every passing day brings new discoveries, new
activities, new sources of complexity, of passion, and of
hope".'
In other words, we frequently arrive at a better understanding of our own law by the light of the analogies
and contrasts which are presented by a different system.
Modern public policy has been permeated by a new spirit
which is expressed in the term "public welfare". Some
speak of it as State Socialism leading to Bureaucracy,
others dub it Liberalism or Progressivism; but it is any
dPierre Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law, 35 Harv.

L. Rev. 838, 858 (1922).
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thing other than a belated attention to the phrase "general
welfare" of the Preamble of the Constitution of the United
States? The principle has been embedded in many municipal organizations which consider a department of public
welfare as vital as a department of public works. It is
having its effect in legislation, administration and judicial
decisions. Fruitful suggestions may be derived from the
Old as well as the New Testament, for the contents of the
Bible are a subject of judicial notice.5 Various jurists have
referred to that Book, in times past, as the revealed law of
God;" and many writers have consulted it for parallel illustrations of concepts or customs which are the historic
antecedents of peculiarities of modern law.' It is submitted
that for many generations much of the doctrine of mala in se
has been buttressed by a deep-seated feeling that its concepts are confirmed by passages in Holy writ. Occasionally
passages of Scripture have been drawn on for legislation.
Thus the Statute Hen. VIII, c. 22 sects. 2 & 3 (1540), revived by the Statute 1 Eliz. c. 1 sect. 3 (1558), restricted the
degrees within which marriage was prohibited to those laid
down in the Eighteenth chapter of Leviticus. As this
statute was enacted prior to the settlement of Jamestown,
it is conceivable that it may be law in some of the American jurisdictions which include inherited Acts of Parliament as part of their common law.8 Another borrowing
from Hebrew law is found in an interesting plan for coping
5

Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. 126, 200 (U. S. 1844); Grand
Lodge v. Johnson, 107 Misc. Rep. 249, 177 N. Y. S. 500 (1919); Spark
v. Union Passenger Ry. Co., 54 Pa. 401, 433-435 (1867); State v.
School Dist. 76 Wis. 177, 44 N. W. 967, 7 L. R. A. 330 (1890).
6
Vidal v. Girard's Exrs. supra n. 5; Irons v. Reyburn, 11 Ark.
378, 382 (1850); Orr v. Quimby, 54 N. H. 590, 610, 611; Lanier v.
Lanier, 5 Heisk. 462, 472 (Tenn. 1871); Forbes v. Cochrane, 2 B. & C.
448, 471 (Eng. 1824) Austin, Jurisp. Lect. 8 sect. 8. A seventeenth
century view went further and ascribed a divine origin to the law
of England-Lilburne's Case, 4 How. St. Tr. 1307 (1649); Manby v.
Scott, 1 Mod. 126 (1663).
7Cf. Holmes, The Common Law.
8Cf. McKean, British Statutes in American Jurisdictions, 78 U.

Pa. L. Rev. 19! (1929).
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with the evil of perjury enacted under William PennO providing that "in case any person.., called to evidence, shall
be convicted of wilful falsehood, such person shall suffer
and undergo such damage or penalty as the person against
whom he or she bore witness, did or should undergo, etc."
This statute was manifestly based upon Deuteronomy 19.
16-19.10 It is not suggested that modern courts will cite
Genesis or the Pauline epistles as binding authority in questions of temporal law; but it has been observed that courts
occasionally make reference to passages of Scripture as
persuasive authority in the support of propositions laid
down in charges to juries or in decisions on questions of
law. Probably the most familiar instance of Biblical citation is that to be found in the case of Omychund v. Barker11
where the question arose as to the validity of the oath of
a non-Christian. Other examples of Biblical reference resorted to in the solution of legal problems in various
branches of law such as trusts ;12 pleading;" title to real
estate;4 murder;15 easements;16 contracts;17 libel;18 and
jurisdiction;"' may be found by a little patient research;
and sufficient material brought to light as will demonstrate
that the saying of a modern writer that the Bible is the
Book which nobody knows, does not apply to judges in
the Anglo-American system of law.
9Act

of May 5, 1682, sect. 26; re-enacted as chapter 36 of "The
Great Laws" for Pennsylvania (Act of Dec. 10, 1682).-Linn, Charter
of William Penn, 102, 116 (1879).
"0Compare sect. 1 of the Code of Hammurabi: "If a man bring an
accusation against a man and charge him with a (capital) crime, but
cannot prove it, he, the accuser, shall be put to death."-Harper, The
Code of Hamurrabi, King of Babylon about 2250 B. C., 11 (1904).
"ll
Atk. 21, 44 (Eng. 1744).
12Dascomb
v. Marston, 80 Me. 223, 232 (1888) and Day v. Essex
Co. Bank, 13 Vt. 97, 102 (1841).
14Schoonmaker v. Dutch Church, 5 How. Pr. 265, 269 (N. Y. 1850).
1SEx parte Schneider, 21 Dist. Col. 433, 436 (1893).
"6Stein v. Hauck, 56 Ind. 65, 69 (1877).
"Thomas v. Thomas, 24 Ore. 251, 256-7, 33 Pac. 565 (1893).
18Giles v. State, 6 Ga. 276, 283 (1849).
19Miller's Estate, 159 Pa. 562, 572 (1894); King v. Cambridge
University, 1 Stra. 457, 567 (Eng. 9 Geo. I).
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